Negotiations in Vienna are set to resume on 29 November between Iran and Europe. There has been very little movement or progress with renegotiating the JCPOA. General arguments for the long delay cite Iranian elections at the end of June and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August but these are half truths at best for explaining this delay.

A Business Insider article by Chatham House’s Sanam Vakil (Senior Research Fellow of MENA) provides a succinct summary of the past few months.

Frankly, I haven’t found an adequate answer to why a diplomatic agreement has failed to occur this past year. The closest thing I’ve come to grasping this is from a Responsible Statecraft report citing Biden’s unwillingness to lift US sanctions on Iran.

“But according to both Western and Iranian diplomats involved in the negotiations, the Iranians then lowered their demand and requested a commitment that Biden would simply commit to staying within the deal for the rest of his own term, granted that Iran also would remain in compliance. According to these sources, the U.S. negotiation team took the matter back to Washington but to the surprise of Tehran and others, the White House was not ready to make such a commitment, citing legal obstacles. Instead, it offered changes to the negotiating text that fell short of a legal commitment.”¹

This all occurred back in June before Iran’s elections.

Another thing I’ve found was an interview of IAEA’s Director General Rafael Grossi by the Stimson Center.² Grossi visited the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss his previous visit to Iran a few weeks prior and met Secretary of State Antony Blinken.³

Current Status on US side

“Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley will lead an interagency team to the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain from November 11-20 to hold consultations with partners and attend a series of regional engagements. He will coordinate our approaches on a broad range of concerns with Iran, including its destabilizing activities in the region and the upcoming seventh round of talks on a mutual return to full compliance with the JCPOA.”⁴

Tiny bit more on this by Reuters and Jerusalem Post.

Two Tangentially related events

I’m just going to put these two things here without a complete understanding of their influence on nuclear diplomacy.

Saudi/Iranian Relations Background

Back in April there was a resumption of diplomatic dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia (hosted by Iraq) for general discussion on their affairs (discuss yearly hajj can be seen as the most basic thing compared to the thornier issues). See USIP’s Iran Primer for more of an overview.

“Iran and Saudi Arabia held direct talks five years after severing diplomatic relations. The talks in Baghdad were mediated by Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi. The Iran delegation was led by Saeed Iravani, deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. The Saudi delegation was led by Khalid al Humaidan, the chief of intelligence. The discussion focused primarily on Yemen, where Riyadh and Tehran have backed opposing sides since the civil war erupted in 2014. The delegations also reportedly discussed the political and financial crisis in Lebanon, where Iran and Saudi Arabia back opposing political blocs.”

These discussions have recently been resumed just prior to the upcoming JCPOA talks.⁵

Houthi advance on Ma’rib

Now going to the issue in Yemen there has been an ongoing offensive by Houthi forces to take Ma’rib, a strategic hub for Saudi Arabia’s coalition forces where the UN backed government resides. This offensive looks to be the decisive element for the future of whatever you want to call this Saudi/Iran Cold War. Waiting for the outcome of this offensive seems to be the MO of both countries involved.

Diplomatic Saudi Row in Lebanon

In a comment before Information Minister George Kordahi took office he criticized the Saudi led war in Yemen. MBS took that opportunity to ban Lebanese goods from entering Saudi Arabia, causing diplomatic and further economic harm to Lebanon. His main reason though is to put pressure on Hezbollah which conlficts with previous Saudi policy of supporting the Hariri family. It looks like Saudi is thinking of changing their relations with Lebanon and it remains to be seen if they will give up any ambitions they have as keeping the status quo.⁶ There’s many outside actors influencing Lebanon and these are just two mentioned actors dictating Lebanon’s future.

• These two issues will continue to factor into the bigger/longer/better new JCPOA deal that Biden says he wants.

Prediction on future viability of JCPOA.

As things currently stand, I expect there to be no resumption on the JCPOA between the United States and Iran in these talks in the next couple weeks. Sanctions by the US will remain in place for the foreseeable future and some progress between Iran and the EU might be made.

Israel still hasn’t decided its own position and has reverted to its older policy of publicly decrying any negotiations while holding off an anything drastic.⁷

Nuclear Stockpile

As previously reported Iran’s enrichment efforts have continued ever since the beginning of this year. Current estimates from the IAEA and other news sites reported that enough fissable material of 90% enriched uranium at about 1 month away.⁸ This stockpile neglects the necessary delivery device everyone says you need. This is the kicker for the so called military option if US and Israeli posturing is to be taken seriously. Estimates are quite fuzzy in open sources for where Iran’s development of an ICBM capable of renetering earth’s atmosphere.